Equality of Opportunity in Education: A Case Study of Chile and Norway by Garces-Voisenat, Juan-Pedro
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Equality of Opportunity in Education: A
Case Study of Chile and Norway
Juan-Pedro Garces-Voisenat
Durham University
30 June 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68887/
MPRA Paper No. 68887, posted 21 January 2016 15:02 UTC
Equality of Opportunity in Education: A Case Study of Chile and 
Norway1 
 
Juan-Pedro Garces-Voisenat2 
 
Department of Economics 
Durham University 
 
 
 
June 2015 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the most important determinants of the distribution of income and life 
opportunities is education. Increasing levels of formal schooling have contributed to raise 
standards of living and eradicate extreme poverty worldwide in recent decades. However, 
inequality in the distribution of income –which is the single most important indicator of 
relative access to material well-being- remains stubbornly high in most regions of the world. 
In this paper, I focus on two countries, Chile and Norway, which have very different 
educational systems, and follow the same analytical methodology of Schütz et al (2008) to 
detect differences in equality of opportunity between the two countries. In a slight 
variation, the family-background effect here is represented by a larger number of variables –
including household income-, in order to pinpoint the specific characteristics that it 
comprises in each country. Surprisingly, I find that the family-background effect is stronger 
in Norway than in Chile, which would denote a potential higher inequality. However the 
higher achievement inequality in Chile is determined by other factors, which need urgent 
reform. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Over the past few years, as poverty rates have decreased substantially in the 
developing world, concern about the distribution of income and life opportunities has 
taken precedence over the traditional goals of eradication of poverty and miserable life 
conditions in poor countries. While there is widespread recognition that the defeat of 
poverty is far from achieved, economists and social scientists have turned their eyes to 
the analysis of inequality and its causes, most notably since the publication of Capital 
in the 21st century (Piketty, 2013) and in a growing trend at least since the world 
financial crisis of 2008. Inequality is seen as the greatest injustice of modern times. 
 
Piketty is not alone in denouncing inequality. Even though nobody seems to have 
gone as far as him in delving into the root causes of the problem –stirring worldwide 
controversy over his results and prescriptions-, there are several others that have also 
tackled the problem from different angles. Chomsky (2011) does it from an 
international perspective, reviving the dependency theories of the 1970s. Stiglitz (2012) 
and Krugman (2007) have warned about the dire consequences that inequality would 
be having on the very same capitalist system and even democracy, due to the 
concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a few. On a more 
detailed and technical perspective, Reich (2012) explains the ways in which inequality 
is turning markets inefficient and outlines policy prescriptions to reverse the trend. 
 
Nonetheless, whatever might be said about the origin of the current stance in terms of 
inequality, most academic analysts tend to agree that one of the most important 
determinants of the distribution of income and life opportunities is education. If there 
is something that can give an edge to disadvantaged members of society is their 
amount of human capital, especially of the type acquired by education. 
 
In modern societies, education is acquired primarily through formal schooling. 
Increasing levels of formal schooling have contributed to raise standards of living and 
eradicate extreme poverty worldwide in recent decades. However, inequality in the 
distribution of income –which is the single most important indicator of relative access 
to material well-being- remains stubbornly high in most regions of the world. 
Moreover, countries with similar levels of educational attainment –and often similar 
levels of average income- present dramatically different achievements in terms of 
equity. There are good reasons to think that a substantial part of the explanation 
might lie in the features of the educational system adopted by each country.  
 
Schütz, Ursprung and Wößmann (2008) measured equality of opportunity in 
education for 54 countries with data on test scores and demographic characteristics 
provided by the TIMMS standardised international tests of cognitive achievement. 
They identified a “family-background effect” as the main determinant of inequality of 
opportunity in education. In this paper, I focus on two countries, Chile and Norway, 
which have a similar equality ranking in Schütz et al (2008), but very different 
educational systems (one largely privatized and the other one of the free-education-
for-all type), and follow the same analytical methodology to detect differences in 
equality of opportunity between the two countries. However, the family-background 
effect here is represented by a larger number of variables –including household 
income-, in order to pinpoint the specific characteristics that it comprises in each 
country. The dataset was obtained from the PISA database for the international 
standardized tests of 2009. 
 
There are some questions which beg for an answer: Are education systems worldwide 
simply perpetuating the statu quo in terms of distribution of resources? Will making 
education more egalitarian reduce inequality overall and increase equality of 
opportunity for the most disadvantaged people in society? And how do we make 
education more egalitarian? The cases of Chile and Norway shed some light into 
answering these questions. The answers, unfortunately, seem not to be so clear-cut. 
But the elements of analysis that this case study provides could lead to policy 
prescriptions that help to level the field in the game of opportunities. This is 
particularly important at a moment when the Chilean government is proposing 
sweeping reforms that would practically reverse the private-minded education system 
implemented since 1981, in which the State plays only a subsidiary role as a provider of 
education. 
 
 
2. The Chilean and Norwegian education systems 
 
 
In Norway, education is completely socialized. The State sees it as its duty to provide 
free education for all citizens at all its levels. On the other end, citizens conceive 
education as a social right, as is well illustrated by Klingstedt (2001). Given the 
enormous amounts of resources that are destined to the education budget, quality is 
almost assured. For example, a school student can expect to receive around 20% of 
GDP per capita in any given year. Since public education is free, guaranteed and of 
good quality, there is little space for private initiative in education to prosper. The very 
few private schools that exist have religious or special-education purposes. 
 
School education is divided into kindergarten, primary (grades 1-7), lower secondary 
(8-10) and upper secondary (11-13). Kindergarten, primary and lower secondary are 
managed by the municipalities, with full funding from the State. Upper secondary is 
run by the counties, with State funding as well. One of the characteristic features of 
the Norwegian system that has been highlighted by the experts is that tracking of 
students occurs at a rather late stage, only in upper secondary school. 
 
There is no selection in primary and lower secondary Norwegian education, but rather 
a declared purpose of giving a high level of basic education to all citizens aged 6-16. 
 
By contrast, in Chile most of the primary and secondary education is provided by the 
private sector. The State has a subsidiary role, mainly as a guarantor that children in 
school age will have access to some type of education. There are basically three types 
of schools: fee-paying private (about 10% of the education supply), subsidized private 
(55% and growing) and municipal (35% and declining). Both the subsidized private 
and the municipal ones receive a voucher per student from the State.  
 The subsidized private schools receive a subsidy because in principle they should be 
mostly free for the students. However, due to circumstances (among others, the low 
amount of the voucher-subsidy), in most of these schools the parents have agreed to 
participate with some form of co-payment to enhance the education of their children. 
This has stirred much controversy in recent years, especially due to the fact that some 
private providers have been obtaining “profits” in the management of the schools. 
 
The Chilean municipal schools are managed by municipal corporations in a totally 
decentralized way. They are not accountable to the Ministry of Education; only to the 
mayor of the municipality. This has increased competition between them, trying to 
capture the greatest possible amount of students, which provides them with more 
voucher-subsidies from the State. As a consequence, the quality in many of these 
public schools has grown, but at the same time municipal budgets have been eroded, 
as the municipalities feel obliged to reinforce the quality of their schools by adding 
financial resources to their funding, to complement the always scarce resources of the 
subsidies. 
 
Finally, the fee-paying private schools thrive. They represent only around 10% of the 
total education supplied in the system, but they can charge high fees to a relatively 
captive clientele, as parents from the upper Chilean class would not send their 
children anywhere else. They normally have state-of-the-art facilities and ample 
opportunities for the students to develop extra-curricular activities. 
 
Most analysts of the Chilean system agree that the system cannot last much longer 
without some kind of reform. But the proposals differ radically, ranging from a semi-
socialization of the system (allowing private schools to function, but banning profits 
and selection, and centralizing the management of the municipal schools in the 
Ministry of Education, as it was before 1981) to a greater liberalization that increases 
the State subsidies for private and municipal management. 
 
Many in Chile see the segregated educational system as the main cause of the high 
level of income inequality in the country, with a Gini coefficient stubbornly above 50% 
for most of its recent history. By contrast, Norway has a Gini of only 25%. 
 
 
3. Literature on educational inequality 
 
 
The family background effect has always been present in determining life 
opportunities, and it gets reflected primarily on the type of education that people 
receive. So education acts sometime as a reinforcing mechanism of inequality, by 
locking in people into their social of economic status. As early as 1968, the eminent 
sociologist James Coleman pondered about this issue (Coleman, 1968), and concluded 
that it is extremely difficult to integrate everyone into the same learning environment. 
However, he maintained hope in the capacity of the teachers to integrate the students 
inside the classroom by understanding their family origin. 
 
There have been numerous attempts to calculate inequality of access to education. 
Measurements of equality in achievement (ie, quality) are harder to find. Both Thomas 
et al (2000) and Benaabdelaali et al (2012) calculate Gini indexes of education, 
measuring equality of access, and find very hopeful trends both in developed and 
developing countries. The first study finds a sort of education Kuznets curve in an 
analysis of 85 countries from 1960 to 1990. The second one carries out a study of 146 
countries in the period 1950-2010, and finds that their calculated Gini index of 
education falls from 0.73 in 1950 to 0.36 in 2010 for developing countries. But both 
studies are basically measuring access, not achievement. 
 
The same trend is found in the school attainment data of Barro & Lee (2010). The 
average years of total schooling at least double for most countries in the period 1950-
2010, and even triple or quadruple for some of them. In Norway they rise from 7.5 to 
11.8, and in Chile from 4.7 to 9.7. 
 
But these numbers mask a more subtle reality in the case of many countries. What 
quality of education are children getting in the different countries of the world? And 
how is that quality distributed within the different sectors of society in any given 
country? At least for the case of Chile, this type of analysis is not very favourable. 
Torche (2005) argues that there is persistent educational inequality across cohorts 
since 1950 in Chile, and that social stratification hasn’t changed at all, regardless of the 
change of system in 1981. This educational stratification leads, in turn, to low 
occupational mobility, particularly at the top of the socioeconomic ladder. Along the 
same lines, Núñez and Miranda (2007) state that low educational and income mobility 
have led to an income distribution that is quite egalitarian for 80-90% of the 
population, but very unequal when the top 10% is considered. And Carvalho et al 
(2013) find that Chile is the most unequal country in Latin America in terms of 
educational achievement, with parental education and type of school as the main 
determinants of this inequality. Ramos et al (2013) have the same impression, pointing 
to the type of school as one of the main factors of discrimination in the labour market 
in Chile. 
 
Parry (1997), while celebrating the success of the Chilean process of education 
privatization, already warned of its shortcomings. She argued that the liberal reforms 
of 1981 had introduced the right degree of decentralization for the system to work 
efficiently. However, she observed a regression in terms of equity, basically due to the 
lack of central support and regulation. Amar (2007) adds that public expenditure per 
student is now lower than in 1970. 
 
Since the type of school seems to be an important element of social and economic 
discrimination in Chile, it is worth asking ourselves why is this the case. Drago and 
Paredes (2011) find that in Chile, when socioeconomic conditions are taken into 
account, the difference of quality between fee-paying private and public schools is very 
small, but there is a significant difference between municipal (public) and subsidized 
private schools, in favour of the latter ones. The authors wonder what might be 
causing this result. Garces (2009) arrives to the same conclusions in a study that 
measures the determinants of academic achievement of 10th grade students in national 
standardized tests. He explains the results by differences of the schools in terms of 
decentralization, accountability and resources. The astounding low performance of 
fee-paying private schools is explained by stratification. Going to one of those schools 
is like belonging to an exclusive club. It provides a strong signal in the labour market. 
 
Mizala and Romaguera (2002) address the problem of low quality of education in most 
Chilean schools by pointing to the lack of incentives. It would be necessary to provide 
incentives to teachers and schools based on their results, rather than just a fixed 
subsidy per student recruited. 
 
Finally, going deeper into the problem of inequality of opportunity posed by unequal 
achievement, Schütz et al (2008) carry out a study of 54 countries using results of the 
TIMMS tests. Basically, they try to estimate the family-background effect (FBE) on 
academic achievement. For that purpose, they use a measure of “books at home” to 
represent the socioeconomic level of the household. The higher influence of “books at 
home” would be a reflection of higher inequality of opportunity in education. 
 
 
4. Measuring relative education inequality in Chile and Norway 
 
 
In what follows, we attempt a very simple exercise using data from the PISA test 
results of 2009, administered by the OECD. These are standardized tests in 
mathematics, science and reading applied to 10th grade students (15-16 years old) in 
different countries. They are administered to some 500 thousand students from 70 
countries around the world, not all members of the OECD. In 2009, the country 
average scores ranged from 325 to 577, with an OECD average of 497. Norway had an 
average score of 500, while Chile obtained 439. 
 
Following Schütz et al (2008), I propose the following basic linear regression: 
 
Tisj = αj + βj FBEisj + γ1j Aisj + γ2j Gisj + γ3j PSisj + εisj 
 
 
T: test scores 
FBE: family background effect 
A: age of student 
G: gender of student 
PS: dummy for attendance to pre-primary school  
i: student, s: school, j: country (1,2) 
 
 
For FBE I use alternative variables (books at home, parental education, household 
income, study implements at home). 
 
Additionally, we have added other variables to reflect characteristics of the schools 
which may affect the student’s performance. 
 
The regressions use panel data with individual observations corresponding to one 
student. The students are grouped in the different schools in which the test is given. 
There are separate regressions for Chile and Norway, in order to compare the 
coefficients between them. 
 
The explanation of the different variables in the regressions is as follows: 
 
 Test scores: PISA 2009, OCDE, average of reading, maths and science, max 723, 
min 179, mean 469 
 
 Books at home (books), 6 cats: 0-10 (1), 11-25 (2), 26-100 (3), 101-200(4), 201-
500(5), 500+(6) 
 
 Age: in years, with two decimals (15-17) 
 
 Gender: 1 for male, 0 for female 
 
 Pre-primary education (pre-prim): 1 yes, 0 no 
 
 Parental education (par-ed) (average of both parents), 5 cats: ISCED 3A (1), 
ISCED 3B-3C (2), ISCED 2 (3), ISCED 1 (4), ISCED 1 not complete (5). Notice 
that the categories ascend as the level of education decreases. 
 
 Study implements at home (at-home): availability of desk, own room, quiet 
place, computer, internet connection and printer at home. Each one of them is 
categorized as 1 or 0, depending on whether they are available or not. Then the 
average is taken to construct the variable. 
 
 Study facilities at school (in-school): availability of library, computer, internet 
connection and printer at school. Each one of them is categorized as 1 or 0, 
depending on whether they are available or not. Then the average is taken to 
construct the variable. 
 
 Annual household income (h-income): reported by parents. This is in six 
categories, which represent ranges of income. Categories ascend with income. 
 
 Decentralization of schools (decent): this variable captures the level of 
decentralization of the schools, as reflected by whether the principal or 
governing board (1) take decisions, rather than the regional or national 
authority (0), in matters of salary increases, budget allocation and student 
admission. The three scores are averaged to construct the variable. 
 
 
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 1 to 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
Chile Norway Chile Norway 
Dep vble: test scores   
  
   
    
Books 8.2 21.4 
  
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
  Par-ed 
  
-6.7 -30.4 
   
[0.000] [0.000] 
Age 6.9 6.1 6.5 8.5 
 
[0.010] [0.123] [0.017] [0.042] 
Gender 9.9 -7.1 8.6 -12.6 
 
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pre-prim 8.5 15.3 8 15.9 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
cons 306 322 347 414 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
  obs  4736 3893 4736 3893 
R2 (adjusted) 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.09 
All regressions have school fixed effects 
  Source of data: OCDE, PISA 2009 
   [P-values in parentheses]       
 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the basic regresions. Age, gender and pre-primary 
education are used as controls throughout the whole set of regressions. They have the 
expected sign and are significant for the most part. Just as a matter of curiosity, the 
male gender seems to obtain better results in Chile but worse results in Norway. An 
increase in age tends to increase test scores, but not always very significantly. And the 
attendance to pre-primary education always favours academic achievement in a clear 
significant way. 
 
Surprisingly, the FBE effect, measured by either books or parental education, is much 
stronger in Norway than in Chile, and in a convincingly significant way. Which makes 
us wonder: If not here, where is the source of inequality in Chile? 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
Chile Norway Chile Norway 
Dep vble: test scores   
  
   
    
at-home 16.2 126.7 
  
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
  in-school 
  
-5.7 24.6 
   
[0.069] [0.003] 
Age 6.1 7.6 5.9 8.5 
 
[0.022] [0.075] [0.026] [0.049] 
Gender 8.9 -11.9 9.3 -11.7 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pre-prim 9.1 18.3 9.8 22.3 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
cons 329 258 346 338 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
  
    obs  4736 3893 4736 3893 
R2 (adjusted) 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.02 
All regressions have school fixed effects 
  Source of data: OCDE, PISA 2009 
   [P-values in parentheses]       
 
 
In Table 2, we try to measure the FBE in a different way. We assess the influence of 
study implements at home on the test scores. Here the difference in favour of 
Norwegian students is crushing. There seems to leave no space for doubt. The family-
background effect is definitely stronger in Norway than in Chile. And that leads us to a 
second question: How do the Norwegian schools counter this powerful influence of 
the FBE to produce such incredible egalitarian results in terms of academic 
achievement and opportunities in the labour market? 
 
We have added two regressions to contrast the influence of the school on scores in the 
two countries. The variable “in-school” summarizes the availability of important study 
facilities at school. The variable has a strong significant influence in Norway but not in 
Chile, which suggests an inefficient use of resources in the school system in Chile. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
 
Chile Chile Chile Norway 
Dep vble: test scores   
  
 
(school FE) (school FE) (OLS, no FE) (OLS, no FE) 
     h-income -1.8 -2.6 
  
 
[0.002] [0.000] 
  at-home 
 
16.9 
  
  
[0.000] 
  in-school 
 
-6.5 
  
  
[0.049] 
  books 
  
20.5 23.2 
   
[0.000] [0.000] 
decent 
  
47 -1.3 
   
[0.000] [0.803] 
Age 9.3 6.7 9.2 6.5 
 
[0.001] [0.018] [0.010] [0.113] 
Gender 26.5 8.3 8.1 -8 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Pre-prim 10.9 10.4 21.4 18.4 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
cons 268 332 191 307 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
  
    obs  4317 4317 4317 3780 
R2 (adjusted) 0.02 0.05 0.2 0.18 
Source of data: OCDE, PISA 2009 
   [P-values in parentheses]       
 
 
Finally, Table 3 shows two types of regression. The first two regressions try to capture 
the influence of household income on academic achievement in Chile (unfortunately 
the income question was not included in the parent questionnaire for Norway). As we 
can see, when reasonable controls are included, there is no advantage of well-off 
students. On the contrary, it seems that more affluent students perform more poorly 
(complacency?). The robustness of this result is tested on regression 2 by adding 2 
more control variables, and the significance of the previous result is reinforced. 
 
In conclusion, the family background effect in Chile is very weak (at least on academic 
achievement) and almost non-existent.  
 
The last two regressions refer to another type of story, which is related to the type of 
reforms that might be needed in Chile. We include in them the usual controls plus the 
most significant FBE variable (books). And we introduce a variable that measures the 
degree of decentralization in the management of the schools. In Norway, this variable 
seems to be not significant at all. By contrast in Chile it is one of the most 
quantitatively (and statistically) significant ones in its effect on the test scores. The 
result tells us that a student from a decentralized school can expect to score 47 points 
more on the tests than their peers of centralized schools. The difference with Norway 
might be due idiosyncratic institutional factors, impossible to discern in this study. 
 
 
5. Some final considerations by way of conclusion 
 
 
The Chilean and Norwegian education results are known to produce very different 
results in terms of equality of opportunity before the labour market and life situations 
in general. This is recognized by most analysts of the subject. There is an equalizing 
environment in Norwegian education that somehow channels the abilities and 
capacities of diverse students into paths of productive professional development no 
matter what their family background. 
 
As we have seen in the results presented in this study, the family background effect is 
very strong in Norway, and apparently stronger than in Chile. The virtues of the school 
system there are strong enough to counter this initial advantage of some students and 
equalize opportunities for all.  
 
What can be said about this hypothetical superiority of the Norwegian school system? 
At least one thing. The State there devotes many more resources to students than in 
Chile. To give only a few examples: The expenditure per pre-primary student in 
Norway doubles that of Chile, and the expenditure per school student is three times as 
high in Norway than in Chile. The ratio of students to teaching staff is 23.4 in Chile, 
while only 10.2 in Norway.  
 
Reforms are clearly needed in Chile, especially to level the field for more 
disadvantaged students. With a general increase in academic achievement, more 
disadvantaged students would be able to threaten the privileged situation of the more 
affluent ones, whose advantage is based only on social stratification and not on 
achievement. They will become more competitive. 
 
In summary, this problem of inequality is basically a problem of quality. 
 
Chile would not do well in scrapping completely the educational system in place. 
Some things are working well; for example the decentralized nature of the system. But 
it need to injects many more resources into the system, perhaps increasing the 
amounts of the subsidies both to private and municipal schools. 
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